Recommendations for the New President of The United States: How Foreign Policy should be shaped for breakthrough negotiations in Iran (Algravez, 2008)

The current presidential race in the U.S. represents a current obstruction for direct negotiations with Iran. As many measures from the outgoing Bush administration have portrayed, every foreign policy action involving Iran is to have unattended outcomes in the election of both presidential candidates. The U.S. elections are scheduled for November 04, 2008 and the elected president will assume office by January 20, 2009, thus leaving 77 days for the incoming presidential advisors in order to shape the policies destined towards Iran.
A further complication to be suffered in this negotiation process is that Iran is also to engage presidential and Majlis (parliament) elections in June 12, 2009. This can bring new opportunities in shaping the structure of negotiations. Three candidate possibilities have been discussed so far:
1) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: The incumbent president of Iran, possibly seeking for a second term (Conservatist / Heavy rhetorical against U.S. influences on the region).
2) Mohammad Khatami: The former president from Iran (Reformist / Favors U.S. Rapprochement).
3) Mehdu Karroubi: The former speaker to the Iranian Parliament (Reformist/ Favors U.S. Rapprochement).
From these presidential options, it is possible to infer a new president in Iran would open new possibilities for establishing closer negotiations with the U.S., this especially if a reformist president is to be elected in Iran.
It is quite critical for the new president of the United States to recognize that Iran’s Foreign Policy is mostly driven by national interest rather than ideology. This has been one of the main reasons why a détente approach towards Iran, as it was followed during the George W. Bush administration, must not be perpetuated:
1) As U.S. military capabilities greatly surpass those of Iran and any coercive approach (sanctions and embargoes) are to be interpreted as existential threats to the existence of the Islamic Republic, the direct result would be the hampering of any further negotiations.
2) As Iran lacks the capabilities to pose a direct attack toward the U.S. and its allies, proxies had been the main strategy to counterbalance the influence from the U.S. in the region and Iran has supported both paramilitary and terrorist groups (Hamas & Hezbollah). Iran has also received support by political actors such as China, Russia, and Venezuela. A re-rapprochement strategy emanating from the U.S. government is to be destined in swerving the Islamic Republic from such activities and allies.
3) If a détente strategy against Iran is to be perpetuated by the next president of the U.S., this nation will not be able to achieve the policy goals intended to maintain stability in the region. In the past years the Arab-Israeli conflict has exacerbated since Hamas won local elections, the Taliban have been fetching social instability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iraq has been pleading for political stability that cannot be granted by the U.S. all alone. The continuation of coercive measures against Iran will not only represent a threat to national interests, but also a policy destined to failure in times when more instability in the region is undesirable.
The next president of the United States has to recognize all the possible geopolitical and economical benefits that better relations with Iran will entail:
1) Iran actually holds the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves, and the world’s second-largest gas reserves[1], implying that the establishment of good relations with Iran will guarantee more stable oil prices for both Europe and the United States.
2) The new president of the U.S. has to consider that tactical cooperation with Iran is not something extraordinary and it has been followed in very special issues: The retrieving of hostages in Lebanon by both Reagan and the George H. W. Bush administrations, Clinton using Iran as a proxy to dispatch arms to Bosnian Muslims in 1994, and finally the opening of a bilateral channel between the U.S. and Iran under the current George W. Bush Administration. This recent bilateral channel with Iran was destined in helping the initial steps of “Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan” (Codename: OEF-A) back in 2001, this bilateral channel was to last one whole year and till it break down under the U.S. invasion to Iraq. The support of Iran in the “war against terror” was not merely destined as a strategy to hinder the possibility of Iran being considered as a terrorist country, but also it was a strategy by political leaders in Iran to finally establish a long awaited diplomatic opening with the country.[2]
3) The new president has to consider that U.S. foreign policy in the region has removed constraints to the Iranian government. Iran has emerged as a middle-power in the region by the overthrowing of Iraq’s Sunni government and the repression of the Taliban forces in Afghanistan, thus bolstering Iran’s geopolitical position in the region.
4) Iran and the U.S. can share many agenda objectives in the region, and this can encourage the cooperation between the two counties. As terrorism activities by Sunni Al-Qaeda are unwanted to the Shi’ite regime in Iran, the new U.S. president can found new opportunities to work a broader shared agenda against terrorism in the region.
In order to establish a satisfactory widening of diplomatic relations with Iran, a solid Framework for negotiations has to be planned with the sole function of knowing both countries strategic needs. A creation of such framework will require certain concessions and precautions:
1) No preconditions to Iran should be established prior negotiations.
2) The possibilities of subtracting Iran from the “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list and all implicit sanctions, but also the potential withdrawal of international economic sanctions that hamper Iran from receiving foreign technological investment in order to develop oil and gas reserve extraction.
3) Security Issues to Iran should be leaved out the table as Washington will not be able to deliver. Public opinion issues and internal political movements have been the main concern in achieving a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran.
Then a framework for successful negations should include two specific issues, the exchange of security needs to United States should be promoted in exchange of economic burdens to Iran.
1) U.S. and International Security Interests:
a. U.S. Security Interests: Iran has to give off any support form terrorist activities involving Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihadist, and other Palestinian opposition groups. Also greater support against Taliban forces both in Afghanistan and Pakistan is desired. The Iranian regime should portray a positive stance towards pacification in Israel. Finally it must be assured that the Iranian Nuclear Program will only attain peaceful energetic uses.
b. If the Islamic Republic wants to be internationally recognized as a middle-range potency in the regional and international realms, a pledge to peace should be ratified by Iran’s government followed by greater participation in regional stability.
c. Measures are to be broadly negotiated with the U.S., the Security Council plus Germany, and the IAEA to finally address all the issues concerning Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities. Once an agreement has been achieved, the further signing and ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty should follow. Stout international monitoring on Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is necessary to assure international commitment to minimize the risks associated with a nuclear arms race endured in the region. Nuclear capabilities should not be the only security concern to the U.S. as also the possible development of biological and chemicals weapons should be proscribed.
d. Iran is also to recognize UN’s Resolutions 242 and 338 to favor a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Iran would have a pinpoint role in the transformation of both Hezbollah & Hamas into exclusively political and social organizations that do not involve terrorism as a mean of action.
e. To portray Iran’s commitments with region stability, Iran must commit to work with the U.S. and local government in the emergence of stable political regimes in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Also Iran is to promote greater instability with the current tensions that have emerged in Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan.
2) Iran’s Economical Issues:
a. Once that U.S. and international concerns on nuclear proliferation are satisfactorily satisfied by Iran’s government, the United States should commit to ending the unilateral sanctions to Iran and to promote the removal of other multilateral actions. Diplomatic relations should be immediately followed to bolster stronger US-Iran ties, but also further negotiation is necessary and dates to responds bilateral claims should de proposed.
b. Once the lifting of multilateral and unilateral sanctions had been materialized, bilateral economical and technological negotiations should be followed in developing oil extraction in the country. The assurance of global oil supply should be a long-term aspiration followed by the promotion of global investment towards Iran.
c. As part of the U.S. incentives approach, the U.S. needs to clarify that no change of regime and of any nature is desirable for the Islamic Republic. Rather, certain Iranian policies that the U.S. has considered as problematical must be terminated without affecting the composition of Iran’s government. The improvement of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations will be a result of further commitments portrayed by the Iranian regime and finally followed by the final recognition of the current Islamist Republic government as the legitimate regime in Iran.
d. Following Iran’s compliance, this country is to be subtracted from the “States sponsor of Terror List” but also all sanctions related with this list should be completely removed.
e. In order to develop credibility between both States, the new U.S. president has to immediately reaffirm the validity of the Algiers Accord signed in 1981 during Tehran’s Hostage Crisis, as this treaty includes a provision of non-interference in Iran’s internal affairs.
[1] EIA (2007). “Country Analisis: Iran”. Energy Information Administration. Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government. Retrieved October, 17, 2008 from: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Background.html.
[2] Leverett, F. (2006). “Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options toward Iran”. Century Foundation Report. New York.